Progress narratives seem ubiquitous in science. These stories justify the manipulation and domination of nature generally, and entities within nature specifically, in the name of
"progress." The tendency of science to tell stories of progress and what is "necessary" to get "there" (wherever it is we are going) is overtly present on the subject of animal testing.
Indeed, our understanding of progress is so intimately tied to animal testing that most of us do not think to question the philosophical legitimacy or "necessity" of its institutionalization.
Instead, any human interest that is thought to propel us "forward" is perceived as legitimate for trumping any animal testing.

To begin this discussion in the context of the pre-spring break Argus articles concerning animal testing at Wesleyan, let me introduce three levels of ethical inquiry concerning animal testing. The first question is whether animals can be used at all. If the answer is yes, the second question is, what particular experiments are appropriate for animal use? The third question concerns what sort of treatment must be given to animals that are used for the approved reason and in approved experiments. The Argus editors and quoted Wesleyan scientists dealt only with the third question.

In the Argus article, I brought up the idea that since all the animals being tested on (except perhaps the fish) are subjects-of-a-life, that is, they have mind states such as perception,
memory, desire, belief, self-consciousness, intention, a sense of the future, emotion, and sentience, compromising their interests in living a life free from restraint and harm may not be ethically justified. The article responded, "However, biology department researchers adamantly deny that their animal subjects experience any such suffering." I invoked the first
question, they respond with the third: given that animal experimenters are justified in conducting any experiments deemed "necessary," which in practice means any experiment that potentially satisfies an experimenterís curiosity, the only ethical dilemma concerns whether animals receive pain and suffering beyond what is "necessary" for the experiment. And this "problem" is easy enough to remedy: lobotomize animals or drug them up.

Why do we not lobotomize and experiment on humans? Why not find out about human neurological functions and muscle development by testing on babies, or the mentally
"incompetent?" After all, these homo sapiens are no more mental "persons" than the animals we experiment on. Surely science is important enough to sacrifice the lives of a few people in order for science to continue in its progression, and surely human subjects would tell us more about humans than nonhuman subjects, no? Instead, we test on animals. This is a consequentialist argument: any animal interest may justifiably be ìsacrificedî if the consequences create a perceived good for the whole. Why, it may be asked, do we not believe this statement in reference to humans? Because humans have some nontradable interests despite the fact that sacrificing these interests could conceivably benefit "the whole." So progress narratives are based on the nontradable interests of humans and the tradable interests of other entities within nature.

Is this preference justified? Not without some argument explaining why animals have no nontradable interests. This argument has not, and cannot, be given as long as the only ethical question we are allowed to ask is question number three. What I am suggesting is that vivisection needs some philosophical justification outside of the progress narrative built around modern science, which structurally prohibits such questions. My hunch is that we will be waiting for this justification for a long time yet if the justification is not based on speciesism, or the preference (like racism and sexism) of one group over another based solely upon membership within that group.

Progress narratives were evoked multiple times in the Argus articles. Phrases such as the need to "sacrifice birds" to the cause, experimenting on animals for "the future" of safe
medicine, and "we don’t waste animals unless we feel it’s worth it," are premised on animals as means to a scientific end: progress. Hence the statement: "animal research is essential if we want to progress as a research institution." We go from "the future" of medicine (which has next to nothing to do with Wesleyan experiments) to "the future" of Wesleyan as a research institution. The sacrifice of animals is justified for either cause.

The Argus editorial stated that "animals are being used ethically." To understand this statement, we need some explanation of what is and is not an ethical action. I ask the Argus ethicists, which ethic are you grounding your statement in? Kantian? Some other deontological ethic? Utilitarianism? Egoism? Social Contract? Care? These theories would give very different answers to your empty statement.

My point is that a discourse needs to occur concerning 1) if nonhuman animal testing is justified and why or why not, and 2) if human testing is justified and why or why not. Until this discourse occurs on this campus, anything deemed "progress" will be justified without ethical foundation.

In closing, the Argus editorial stated: "we all benefit from animal research." What do you mean "we?" Let’s truly "progress" as a university by reconceptualizing our relationship to
nature and nonhuman animals.