College of Social Studies

           Thomas Hobbes 1588-1679) is the author of one of the most powerful conceptions of human nature in the history of political thought.  In the first part of the Leviathan he presents a conception of the person as a rational egoist.  He conceives of the human being as a kind of machine: "For what is the heart, but a spring;  and the nerves, but so many strings;  and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body?" (p. 1, "Introduction").¹ Each of us is but a complex organization of matter in motion, and on the basis of this image he gives an account of sensation, language, thought, rationality, the passions, voluntary movement, and motivation.  This is all set out in the first twelve chapters of the Leviathan, and the picture that emerges is one of human beings who are egoistic in the sense that they are moved to action only to gratify their own desires or to escape the objects of their aversions.  They are also rational in the sense that they are capable of learning the consequences of their actions, and of choosing an action whose consequences are, on the whole, most conducive to the satisfaction of their desires.  This conception of rationality is called "instrumental rationality" because it limits the role of reason to the discovery of the best means to our ends.  Reason, in this view, is an instrument of our desires or, as Hume would later put it, a slave of our passions.  Reason is also instrumental in the (related) sense that it can be used to judge our beliefs about the world, and to determine whether a maxim of behavior or a choice of action is most likely to advance our goals.  But, according to this view, reason cannot be used to determine the (ultimate) goals we should pursue, or what things we should desire.  Reason is limited to assessing the consistency of different ideas or statements – Hobbes calls it a kind of "reckoning."  Therefore, while it can tell us if our actions are consistent with our goals, in the sense that they will advance these goals, or if our goals are consistent with each other, it offers no grounds for choosing among goals or values.  (A similar view of the limitations of “practical” reason – reason as applied to action – is presented by Max Weber, over 250 years later.)

            Now if human beings are rational egoists, each motivated to act on the basis of rational calculations of his or her own individual advantage, how is social order possible?  What will social relations be like among creatures such as these?  Much depends on exactly what goals we seek – how, in other words, we define our “self-interest.”  You should pay careful attention to Hobbes's account of how we come to have certain goals, and what they are.

            His answer to the question of what social relations would be like among humans in the absence of a political order is set out in chapter 13, "Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning their Felicity and Misery."  In the state of nature, Hobbes argues, "social" relations will be a state of war of everyone against everyone else:

     In such condition there will be no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain:  and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force;  no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and, which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. (62)

    This is not a pretty picture, and for the rest of the book Hobbes sets out a theory of how we can avoid it.  His basic idea is that social order requires the existence of a system of rules regulating individual conduct, but this system will be effective if and only if the rules are enforced by an agency that has an effective monopoly of force.

            Hobbes does not use the phrase "an effective monopoly of force," and  it seriously understates what Hobbes takes to be the necessary condition for social order.  What is distinctive about his position is that the power of the state must be absolute.  Hobbes (along with Bodin) is the father of the idea of "sovereignty."  Prior to Hobbes most political thinkers thought of the state as bound by a moral and legal order, and saw the purpose of the state as upholding that order.  Hobbes is a radical thinker in that he completely rejects this traditional view, arguing instead that the state itself must be the source of the moral and legal order it upholds.  There must, Hobbes argues, be a supreme power within the state, a sovereign authority whose decisions are absolutely final, that is not answerable to anyone for its decisions.  Much of the Leviathan consists of an account of the theory of sovereignty, together with a defense of Hobbes's central claim that a social order can be stable only when there is a sovereign authority.

            But how is it possible for there to be a sovereign authority within society?  What does this require?  Evidently, one person or even one small group could hardly coerce everyone else to obey his or their orders, because the combined strength of the whole would be greater than that of any part.  (What assumptions does Hobbes make in offering this argument?)  If I am to get you to obey me, then I will need the support of others in order to have more power than you, and so be able to force you to do my bidding.  But why would others be willing to support me?  Since everyone acts only in his or her own interests, others would support me in coercing you only if it were in their interests to do so.  But why would supporting me be in their interests?  In answering this question, Hobbes argues that if I am enforcing the law, and so acting to make social order possible, then my actions are in the interests of everyone except the person whom I am coercing.  Thus, everyone else will support me, and I will have an overwhelming advantage of power in relationship to each person in the society who might be tempted to break the law.  Thus, Hobbes concludes, a political agency, the mortal god, Leviathan, could in principle be formed from the unanimous agreement of everyone in society to obey it, because it is in the interests of everyone that it exist.  And so, he argues, a social contract could bring it into being.

            If a political order requires an institution that exercises an effective monopoly of force, then the question becomes, "What sort of institution would be most effective?"  Should it be a monarchy, an aristocracy, or a democracy?  What are the advantages and disadvantages of each?  (Note that in posing this question we are making distinctions among the forms of government – but in every case the government would be "sovereign";  that is, it would have the powers of the Leviathan, as Hobbes outlines them.)  Hobbes answers this question in the first few chapters of Part II, especially ch. 19.  In considering Hobbes's answer, you should pay particular attention to his account of what the purpose of government is, for it is only in terms of that purpose that different forms of government can be assessed.  In this regard, you should note his discussion of this matter in ch. 30.

            Given the importance Hobbes attaches to the maintenance of order, it is not surprising that he was preoccupied with the problem of political stability.  Much of Part II can be read as a theory of political stability, in which the impact of such factors as economic and social equality, different religious practices, and systems of taxation are considered.  Some of the issues Hobbes discusses, including law, freedom, and punishment, will come up again and again throughout the term.