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Fall, 2004 |
Ernesto Verdeja |
[
Introduction
] [ Assignment ]
[ Essay Questions ]
Much of modern thought is characterized by what we might call a "denaturalization" of ethical and political life, a divorce of ethical and political practices and understandings from what is taken to be natural, or given. The first theorists we studied, Hobbes, Bentham, and Locke, sought to develop a set of moral and political principles based on accounts of human nature, but even in their cases there were hints of a different foundation. The metaphor of the social contract, for example, suggests that agreement or consent is the critical basis for political order. And this suggestion was taken up by Rousseau, who, as we saw, began to shift the basis for political theory from nature to history, a shift that culminates in Marx, particularly in his account of historical materialism and in the critique of "utopian socialism." Common to all of these theories is a central concern with human emancipation, with the creation of a society that is based on norms that all people could accept under conditions of freedom and equality.
This emancipatory project is based in part upon a conception of the self as a subject. The self is seen in terms of its capacity to direct activities on the basis of reflection, and to control its behavior in accordance with universal moral rules that apply to all, and that guarantee human freedom and equality. This vision is accepted by both Liberals and Marxists, although they disagree about the possibility of realizing it in a capitalist system.
Nietzsche offers a radical critique of this ideal, going so far as to call this morality a form of nihilism. Perhaps the most striking point at which Nietzsche parts company with the other thinkers we have studied is in his metaphor of the lamb and the great birds of prey (p. 44). Part of the point of this metaphor is that there is no way that the birds of prey can justify themselves to the lambs, nor that the lambs could accept any account the birds would offer. Nietzsche contends that the demand for such justification is misplaced. It is not only misplaced, it is a manifestation of ressentiment — of the resentment on the part of the weak of the superiority of the nobles, and of one's own weakness.
Ressentiment is at the root of what Nietzsche calls slave morality, by contrast with the morality of the masters. The former is based on the opposition of good and evil, while the latter is based on the opposition of good and bad. The masters begin with a sense of their own value, affirming the self, their will to power, their instinct for freedom; their morality is a morality of self-assertion. For them, the "bad" is what fails to measure up to what one is, and thus what one has contempt for – plebeians, lower classes, etc.
Good and evil, by contrast, begin with resentment at one's domination by others. Evil is what they do to you, and so good is what you are. But your goodness is derivative, merely a negation of what is taken as evil. This "need to direct one's view outward instead of back to oneself is the essence of ressentiment" (36-7). It is fundamentally reactive, a response to the actions of others. Needless to say, what is deemed "good" in noble morality is "evil" in slave morality.
Nietzsche argues that we necessarily express our natures in our action. The strong person acts and expresses his strength by dominating others, acting to realize his own purposes. The weak person, motivated by ressentiment, imagines himself as freely choosing his own actions, and so as responsible for them. But this is an error for we cannot separate our activities from our character. Those who hold a slave morality see the strong man (in using the term “man” I follow Nietzsche's usage) as free to be weak, and so they wish to hold him accountable for what he does. Similarly, the weak go on to distinguish themselves from the strong, and hold up their opposite traits as goods or virtues, as if they were freely chosen. Thus, belief in the "neutral, independent subject" makes possible the "self-deception that interprets weakness as freedom, and their being thus as a merit" (46). In this way Nietzsche deconstructs the concept of the person as a “subject” or agent, which is central to all forms of modern morality, including especially Kantianism. (Nietzsche also heaps scorn on utilitarianism.)
Nietzsche's account of the origins of what he calls "slave morality" is rich and suggestive, though obviously controversial. But even if we suppose that it is true, what relevance does it have for how we should view these moral beliefs today? Even if they originally resulted from or were motivated by resentment, might we not affirm them now on other grounds? Isn't Nietzsche's critique an example of the genetic fallacy?
This question leads to a second important aspect of Nietzsche's argument, his idea of "genealogy." He insists that the meaning of a social practice changes over time as different individuals and groups bend it to their wills. It is an error, he argues, to assume a constant function over time for some superficially similar practice, such as that of punishment. Thus, the fact that morality developed under certain conditions, and emerged first as the morality of a particular group, doesn't mean that it has the same meaning today. Nonetheless, its genealogy is essential to an understanding of its current significance.
What is critical about modern western morality (which derives from Judeo-Christian morality) is that it is essentially reactive, based on a resentment of superior men, and it demands conformity with its precepts. But this does not mean that Nietzsche would have us return to the morality of the nobles – a return that would in any event be impossible because of the ways in which society has changed since that time. And even if it were possible, it would be undesirable. For the noble, as Nietzsche points out, when not bound by specific ties, tends to go back to the innocent conscience of the beast of prey. What Nietzsche calls the "taming of man" is the task of slave morality, under which we come to have a "soul" and a rich inner world. This is, ironically, because slave morality gives us guilt and bad conscience.
Basic to all life is the will to power, or freedom: the affirmation of the self through the realization of its projects, its will, the bending of the world to its ends. Under certain conditions, and for certain groups, this will to power becomes "introjected," turned inward, against the self. Instead of striving to turn the world to one's purposes, one seeks to impose an order on one's own, animal nature. This is the key to bad conscience and to guilt – the turning against the self of the will to power, so that it takes the form of a will to impose order not on the world but on the self. It is a kind of self-imposed cruelty, which, like all forms of cruelty, brings a certain delight to the person who performs it on himself.
Guilt and bad conscience also underlie the ascetic ideal, which is the renunciation of desire, of sexuality and the will to power itself, that is, of life. Its highest form is the development of the idea of sin, in which one's suffering comes to be seen as a punishment for one's having sinned, so that the "invalid is turned into the sinner." The ascetic ideal provides answers to the question of the meaning of suffering, but in this answer is a hatred of all things human, of life, a will to nothingness.
This complex of bad conscience, guilt, and morality – the ascetic ideal – is a kind of sickness that is pervasive in our culture. Even science, which is often seen as opposed to religion, manifests it, because science is premised upon a commitment to truth. But, Nietzsche insists, we must push further and ask what is value of truth, for we must criticize even that commitment. In rejecting the claims of truth and morality, we may free ourselves so that we can affirm our life and our world.
Assignment: Friedrich Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morals.
1. Write an essay responding to Nietzsche's parable of the lambs and the birds of prey.
2. Why does Nietzsche reject the idea of universal justice? Is his argument plausible?
3. Is contemporary morality nihilistic?
4. Critically evaluate Nietzsche's critique of "truth."
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