Thank God William Safire Is NOT Commander-In-Chief by Olivia DeBree Putting troops in another country is a dangerous exploit, an idea not to be casually thrown about. Yet, William Safire does just this. He says invade Iraq, put troops on the ground, replace the Iraqi government. Forget all this mumbo-jumbo about more prudent strategy. Saddam's the problem, so get him out of power. Many people realize getting Saddam out of Iraq would be the ideal solution, but to presume that this is also realistic is naïve. Safire proposes four strategic options specific to the most recent Iraqi crisis and criticizes three of those four options. Safire says doing nothing about Saddam's latest antics (the first option) would make the U.S. "the world laughingstock." He also reduces the third option, a light air attack, to ridicule by referring to it as the "300 pinpricks" strategy. And he clearly kills the fourth option (heavy air attack) at the end of his article, when he says, "So long as our purpose is only to "degrade" facilities, rather than to replace an aggressive regime, the strategic advantage is [Saddam's]." Safire advocates the second option, invading Iraq with ground troops in order to depose Saddam and install a democratic government. But he suggests this idea haphazardly, because he never probes its merits and imperfections. An invasion will not occur under the present circumstances and for good reason. To begin with, the U.S. military does not want to risk further casualties. Since U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1993, when an initial intention to aid starving people evolved into an operation to capture a Somalian warlord and resulted in the brutal murder of U.S. soldiers, the military has resisted the temptation to put U.S. troops in foreign territory. Furthermore, memories of Vietnam have not dissipated. Meddling in the affairs of a smaller country elicits panicked responses from people who lived through and fought in the Vietnam War. Clinton is not up for reelection, but public opinion influences his decisions nonetheless. Secondly, it will not be easy to kill Saddam or even to simply wrest power from him. The last thing the U.S. needs is a failed attempt to assassinate. Didn't we learn from the Bay of Pigs Invasion? (Incidentally, both U.S. and U.N. law prohibit assassination, so it would be both illegal and hypocritical to assassinate Saddam in order to enforce U.N. inspections). Thirdly, installing a new government in Iraq would require U.S. occupation-perhaps for a considerable time. Are we really prepared to devote immense military, technological, and financial resources to this cause? Wouldn't our security be even more endangered than it is now if we had troops in Iraq for the long haul? Furthermore, there is no indication that a democracy could function in Iraq. Sustainable democracies require a democratic political culture. Iraq has no parties, religious organizations, or other marks of "civic culture". The Iraqi people have no reason to expect their votes to count or to trust a government to peacefully solve domestic issues (through ballot boxes, interest groups, etc…). There is no precedent for embracing norms of tolerance and individual rights. And without any of these, it is naïve to assume the Iraqi people would respect the law-even if its authority comes from a democratic political structure. As far as legalities go, Article 2, Section 4 of the United Nations Charter prohibits use of force by its member-states. Article 51 does allow for the use of force in self-defense, but an argument for overthrowing and replacing the Iraqi government out of self-defense carries little support. As long as we're on the subject of technicalities, perhaps we should read the fine print for such an invasion: thousands of innocent and defenseless Iraqi citizens will die. These words should be in bold print, in headlines, and firmly stamped into our brains. Why don't you italicize this point, Mr. Safire? U.S.-imposed economic sanctions leave thousands of Iraqi children starving and sick-no, make that dead-each month. Can we, in good conscience, choose a strategy that will result in the deaths of more Iraqi citizens-who deserve no blame for the actions taken by their oppressive and authoritarian government? Do we value civilian Iraqi lives as much as U.S. military lives? Finally, Safire makes a gross error when he dismisses the significance of a unified international coalition. A close look at Safire's understanding of Iraqi motivations reveals how and why he makes this mistake. Safire says Saddam's "ultimate purpose is to be able to credibly bluff the West into letting him dominate his part of the world." Iraqi motivations are not this simple. Instead, they involve complex domestic and international concerns. Hussein plays this game of chicken (threatening international security and then conceding at the last possible minute before implementation of military threats) in order to wear down international consensus. He hopes to gain a small concession with each new resistance to U.N. law and to eventually cause fragmentation among the great powers. This time he almost succeeded, as both French and Russian consent for the proposed U.S. strike arrived only after diplomatic efforts. If the U.S. invades Iraq, France and Russia will protest loudly and perhaps take radical steps to oppose the invasion. The prospect for escalation and the potential for world war should never be taken lightly. Consequently, international unification is vital to world peace, and Safire is thoughtless to belittle its significance. Mr. Safire has some nerve to suggest in a highly-esteemed, national newspaper that the U.S. invade Iraq and then not present to his readers the pros and cons of this argument. He makes a complex issue look simple. He decides how the U.S. should respond to the situation in Iraq by a process of elimination: The other three strategic options won't work, so go ahead with the fourth option. Invade, Safire declares. The public may give a New York Times columnist a head start-assuming he has inside knowledge or expertise in the issues he addresses, but this doesn't give him license to propose ideas without considering them thoughtfully. A journalist cannot guess what impact her writing will have on the public or policy-makers, so she is charged with immense responsibility. She must go to whatever lengths necessary to ensure her reflections are both accurate and meticulous. Get respect, Mr. Safire. William Safire writes OP-ED columns for The New York Times. The excerpt below is from an article printed in the Nov. 12, 1998 issue of The New York Times. Saddam's Strategy" By William Safire Forget the fascination with our semiannual military buildup in the Persian Gulf to persuade Saddam Hussein "this time we're really, really serious." That point's been made… Focus instead on the strategy of both sides... President Clinton has four strategic options: One is to do nothing, become the world laughingstock…Another is to remove Saddam's threat by a second invasion ,this time setting up a democratic government in Iraq as we did in 1945 in Germany and Japan. Neither of these options is being considered by this White House. Instead, we have strategic choice No. 3: "300 pinpricks" to exhibit our extreme irritation. Cruise missiles launched from sea for a couple of weeks, accompanied by film showing the uncanny smartness of our munitions, would be followed by our unilateral declaration of "mission accomplished" and a promise to annoy Iraq again next year. The fourth choice is the "degrade his capabilities" option, which seems to be in favor: Use cruise missiles at first to disrupt communications and depress air defenses, then strike with carrier aircraft and heavy bombers from land bases. This would target suspected weapons manufacturing sites, tank parking lots and army barracks, similar to our softening-up air campaign of a decade ago. The Clinton Joint Chiefs would claim we successfully "degraded" his threat. That military jargon means "temporarily lessened" but by no means "ended." We would again wait for an internal revolt to topple him (as we have been for Fidel Castro for 40 years). If it doesn't work out, that's the next U.S. President's problem, though Saddam may then be in a position to reach for his ultimate strategic goal. What is that goal? And could the incipient aerial punishment help Saddam achieve it? First, it is to endure and survive ... Second, counterattack with his people's suffering… Finally, make a deal with the U.N. for limited access by non-American inspectors... Although Saddam miscalculated wildly a decade ago, his current strategy takes full advantage of Clinton's expected decision to wage limited air war with its modest compliance aim. So long as our purpose is only to "degrade" facilities rather than to replace an aggressive reime, the strategic advantage is his. His ultimate purpose is to be able to credibly bluff the West into letting him dominate his part of the world…. The U.S. has no missile defense. Does a prudent President let him grab those oilfields, or will Clinton's successor be forced to gamble a U.S. city on the hope that a homicidal maniac is only bluffing?