Between War and Peace: Faculty Book on How States Manage Militias

Armed militant groups exist throughout the world—Chechen rebels in Russia, ethnic militias in Myanmar, ISIS in Northern Iraq, for example—but they do not all bring constant conflict and warfare. It is common for militias to be tolerated by the states they oppose and have been in long-term periods of ceasefire; some are even allowed to operate and participate in everyday life and governance.

Assistant Professor of Government and Global South Asian Studies Kolby Hanson investigated this phenomenon in a new book, Ordinary Rebels: Rank-and-File Militants Between War and Peace, published by the Oxford University Press on Sept. 16. In his book, Hanson provides new research to address key questions on how states and militias interact and behave in times of conflict and peace.

“This is a book about armed groups in the gray space between war and peace: who they are, what they want, and how they are changed by the experience of state toleration,” Hanson wrote. “When states tolerate militants—allowing them to more freely recruit and train new soldiers, patrol territory, and participate in local governance—it transforms armed organizations and their behavior for years to come.”

The book focuses on rebels in two ways: how people decide to take up arms against their government and which groups to join, as well as how armed movements change when they are allowed to take part in governance. To find this out, Hanson and his team surveyed 471 likely recruits and civilian elders in known militia recruiting hotspots in Northeast India—gathering places like tea shops, stadiums, and moonshiners—from 2015 to 2017. He also conducted 76 in-depth interviews with leaders of armed organizations, soldiers, and civilians in Northeast India and Sri Lanka.

Hanson found that when states permit militant groups room to operate, it allows militia members to serve their cause while living more comfortably thus creating a more attractive situation for potential recruits. This can lead to armed groups growing in size, but often with recruits that are less motivated and disciplined, he said. Also, long-term ceasefire and state toleration can cause a group to become increasingly moderate because supporters and recruits tend to view pragmatic approaches to conflict and governance as more attractive than extremist approaches.

“When the government is willing to extend this hand of ceasefire, it makes it possible to achieve some of the more low-level goals,” he said.

Once a ceasefire is reached, it can also lead to extended periods of entrenched calm between groups. Nagaland, one of the states in India where he conducted his study, has been in ceasefire with the Indian government for 28 years. Hanson found that the average long-term truce between a militia and government lasted more than 15 years, and more than half had not seen a resumption of violence.

“There are a lot of cases around the world where you get exactly this pattern of something that seems like a temporary move—or at least seems temporary in the two-, three-, four-year sense—becomes a 30- or 40-year relationship between the government and the militants, in which the government hasn't won but they've bought peace by tolerating low-level militant activity,” Hanson said.

While surveying likely recruits on their motivations and factors that could lead to them joining an armed group, he found that lifestyle conditions were the most important consideration. Access to even small comforts—like would they have shelter and food to eat—were significantly motivating factors in joining a group. He said potential recruits are more willing to join a movement that does not pose as much risk of danger, stress, or discomfort.

“During a conflict or during a government crackdown, [a rebel] might be living out in the woods, sleeping outside, and having cold meals,” Hanson said, “as opposed to in ceasefire, you could build a semi-permanent base, have a warm meal, a few rupees at the end of the month, some cigarettes, and not sleep out in the rain. The argument is actually those very mundane lifestyle features really do matter for people.”

Alongside the impacts observed on militia groups themselves, Hanson also analyzed the side effects of state toleration on locals in regions ruled by militant groups. For example, in Northeast India, militias tax civilians in the area without the formalized power to do so. It can also lead to less strategic violence against civilians, since violent acts can be used as a tool by militias for political gain in wartime.

Looking at all three perspectives, Hanson’s book argues that state toleration can impact the growth of these groups, how effective and violent they are, and the day-to-day experiences of the civilians that are surrounded by them. As he outlines throughout his research, when dealing with an armed group, a state's calculus may come down to whether they are willing to coexist with them, potentially at a larger size, in exchange for peace.