Organ
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Organology
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Organization
Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930):

“During the last few generations mankind has made an extraordinary advance in the natural sciences and in their technical application and has established his control over nature in a way never before imagined. [...] Men are proud of those achievements, and have a right to be. But they seem to have observed that this newly-won power over space and time, this subjugation of the forces of nature, which is the fulfillment of a longing that goes back thousands of years, has not increased the amount of pleasurable satisfaction which they may expect from life and has not made them feel happier.”

“With every tool man is perfecting his own organs, whether motor or sensory, or is removing the limits to their functioning. Motor power places gigantic forces at his disposal, which, like his muscles, he can employ in any direction; thanks to ships and aircraft neither water nor air can hinder his movements; by means of spectacles he corrects defects in the lens of his own eye; by means of the telescope he sees into the far distance; and by means of the microscope he overcomes the limits of visibility set by the structure of his retina. In the photographic camera he has created an instrument which retains the fleeting visual impressions, just as a gramophone disc retains the equally fleeting auditory ones; both are at bottom materializations of the power he possesses of recollection, his memory. With the help of the telephone he can hear distances which would be respected as unattainable even in a fairy tale. Writing was in its origin the voice of an absent person, and the dwelling-house was a substitute for the mother’s womb, the first lodging, for which in all likelihood man still longs, and in which he was safe and felt at ease.”

“Man has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic God. When he puts on all his auxiliary organs he is truly magnificent; but those organs have not grown on to him and they still give him much trouble at times. [...] Future ages will bring with them new and probably unimaginably great advances in this field of civilization and will increase man’s likeness to God still more. But in the interests of our investigations, we will not forget that present-day man does not feel happy in his Godlike character.”

Curt Sachs, *The History of Musical Instruments* (1940)

Curt Sachs, a 20th century organologist and a paternal figure for the field of organology, begins his 1940 canonical text, *The History of Musical Instruments*, with a search for the mythic origins of the first instrument. Repeating a conceptual confusion common to imperialist knowledge formations, Sachs looks to a mixture of archeological artifacts and contemporary non-European indigenous practices to locate evidence of prehistoric origins. In doing so, Sachs argues that the instrument’s mythic place of departure is the body itself and its innate impulse to “express emotion by motion” (25). Sachs writes that the body’s emotional movements are often audible and that these sound-making emotional motor impulses were the first music and the body was the musical instruments -- a hand repeatedly hitting a thigh, a foot repeatedly stomping on the ground. Eventually, Sachs argues, early humans started replacing and extending their body with objects and thus instruments, as objects external to the body, were born.

Sachs classifies musical instruments, as external objects, into five categories: idiophones (vibrating objects that are struck or shaken), membranophones (stretched membranes that vibrate to produce sound), chordophones (vibrating strings produce sound), aerophones (vibrating air produces sound), and electrophones (electricity produces sound). Sachs discusses how instruments, in being both of the body and beyond the body, take on a contradictory significance. On the one hand, they often stand in for the body and in doing so, are both gendered and sexualized: flutes are phalluses to blow, string instruments are women to caress, and playing them becomes a ritualized sexual scene. On the other hand, instruments, in their externality, are one of the ways that bodies make contact with the spirit realm and immaterial forces. Sachs writes: “man whirls a board or blows into a hollow branch, or a shell, or a bone, and a voice answers. What voice? Whose voice? Not his own, not another man’s. Is it a spirit, a demon, an ancestor? A supernatural power, invisible and impalpable, becomes audible; a magic manifestation is brought about by a man’s act” (42). In Sachs’ eyes and ears, an instrument is both the body and beyond the body, both inside and outside, sensual and spiritual, material and immaterial.

Veronica Doubleday analyzes the gendered meaning of instruments and the ambivalent position instruments hold within the history of feminine objectification under patriarchy. Doubleday writes, “in instrumental performance, a relationship is set up between the instrument and performer, creating a contested site of meaning” (4), and in many cultural contexts, this contested site of meaning comes with a misogynist inheritance. Doubleday shows the ways in which most instruments have come to be thought of as objects exclusively under the dominion of men, with only a few instruments deemed appropriate for women (e.g. the harp in European contexts). In many contexts, women are historically assumed to be vocalists and dancers, their bodies already rendered instruments by patriarchy, and it is a feminist intervention to become a player, seize control of the means of instrumental production, and play instruments thought to be played typically by men. For Doubleday, instrumentalists “use of musical instruments in the construction of human gendered identities” (22), and instruments are potent symbolic tools for negotiating gendered hierarchies.


“What does it mean for an object to be considered an extension of the body? What does such an annexation look like? What is at stake philosophically and conceptually in such a transformation?”

“To some contemporary feminist thinkers, the retention of objecthood can be not only positive but also a form of survival. For scholars such as Martha Nussbaum and Leslie Green, it comes down to parsing types of objectification. Nussbaum has built a systematic typology, and Green assesses levels of instrumentality. Green asserts: ‘We must treat others as instruments, for we need their skills, their company, and their bodies—in fact, there is little that we social creatures can do on our own.’ This realization can enhance understanding of the elderly, the disenfranchised, the ill and disabled, she argues, those who ‘miss not only their diminished agency, but also their diminished objectivity,’ as ‘they become...subjectified.’

Bates brings theoretical work on the agency of things -- i.e. the capacity of seemingly insentient and inanimate nonhuman things to act and produce effects -- by scholars such as Bruno Latour and Jane Bennett to bare on thinking about musical instruments. Bates theorizes instruments as things with powers of their own, arguing that the confusion between body, spirit, and object that occurs in the instrument is part of their capacity to enact material effects in the world beyond their use by players.

At the end of Bates’ article he poses the following series of questions:

• “Does the performer perform the instrument or the other way around?
• Why are some musical instruments caught in an allegorical web overflowing with symbolism and symbolic associations, while others comparatively seem to lack symbolic references?
• Why are some (but not all) instruments anthropomorphized; for example, being regarded as capable of crying or feeling sorrow?
• Why do some instruments have an instrumental role in moral pedagogy, meaning that simply from the act of repetitively playing them the player becomes a better or worse human being or a subject of the nation?” (387)


“Described as sounding human, The Hammond organ offers a way to think about the breakdown between human and machines. In a testimony given at Rev. F. W. McGee’s Blackpentecostal church service, on January 28th, 1930, one Brother Steadfast asks the saints to pray, ‘that I may be used as an instrument in his hand’ (McGee 1992, track 9). This desire for instrumentality, I argue, structures the Blackpentecostal imagination, is an enactment of black thought, such that any object can be sacralized, made holy. People not only beat tambourines and stomp feet but play washboards with spoons and blow whistles. The Hammond organ is in this tradition, the utilization of any object for sacred possibility. And in such making sacred of objects, the instrument is not the Hammond on the one hand or the musician on the other: the instrument is the sociality of the spirit-filled musician with the musical object working together.”
Emily Dolan, “Toward a Musicology of Interfaces” (2012)

“What would it mean to tell a history of music from the perspective of instruments used to produce it?”

“Any instrument is a model of control and organization; indeed the basic idea behind an instrument is that it is a technology that is both manipulable and behaves predictable. Yet this was often more a goal to which both instrument builders and composers strove than a result that could be taken for granted.”

Emily Dolan and John Tresch, “Toward a New Organology: Instruments of Music and Science” (2013)

“Any history of instruments must also account for their changing forms of agency and visibility. Do we understand a given instrument within a given context as passive and obedient to the hand of the user, or does it appear as active, occasionally beyond the user’s complete control? How much does the instrument control the user, and vice versa?”

Thomas Patteson's Instruments for New Music: Sound, Technology, and Modernism (2016)

“The instrumental innovations of the early twentieth century were not merely isolated experiments but rather part of a systematic, wide-ranging investigation into the technological foundations of sound and its implications for the art of music. [...] Instruments make music in a double sense: they create sounds, but they also forge connections to the aesthetic, social, and metaphysical realities that give these sounds meaning, charging them with the current of human significance. What music is depends, to a large degree, on what instruments can do. [...] The history of instruments, when properly told, concerns not just the objects themselves but also what they promise, portend, and make possible.”

"Pharmakon: at once, a good and an evil, at once a remedy and a poison."

"Two inseparable yet contradictory economies operate with the same organs: these two economies call for an organology, which is also a pharmacology, given that what an organ can accomplish in the material economy may be contrary to what this very same organ makes possible in the spiritual economy:

'The same senses, the same muscles, the same limbs; more than that, the same types of signs, the same tokens of exchange, the same language, the same modes of logic that function in the most indispensable actions of our life, all likewise figure in our most gratuitous, conventional, and extravagant actions.' (Valéry)

These two economies are always in a relation of conflict over values, because our species always lives on two planes at once, which are also two different scales of value: the plane of conservation, on which all living being live, and a plane that exceeds this conservation:

'In short, man does not have two sets of equipment, he has only one; and sometimes it functions to maintain his life, his physiological rhythm, and sometimes it furnishes the illusions and labors of our great adventure.' (Valéry)

And our organs—physiological and artificial—are always simultaneously at the service of these two economies, developing in parallel: 'The same ship or rowboat brought merchandise and gods...ideas and methods.'

"Technics (prostheticity) plays an essential role because it is eminently pharmacological, particularly as the system of artificial organs it forms in the industrial age."


"Surveillance capitalism births a new species of power that I call instrumentarianism. Instrumentarian power knows and shapes human behavior toward others’ ends. Instead of armaments and armies, it works its will through the automated medium of an increasingly ubiquitous computational architecture of ‘smart networked devices, things, and spaces.’"

"Just as industrial society was imagined as a well-functioning machine, instrumentarian society is imagined as a human simulation of machine learning systems: a confluent hive mind in which each element learns and operates in concert with every other element. In the model of machine confluence, the ‘freedom’ of each individual machine is subordinated to the knowledge of the system as a whole. Instrumentarian power aims to organize, herd, and tune society to achieve a similar social confluence, in which group pressure and computational certainty replace politics and democracy, extinguishing the felt reality and social function of an individualized existence. The youngest members of our societies already experience many of these destructive dynamics in their attachment to social media, the first global experiment in the human hive."

"Instrumentarianism: defined as the instrumentation and instrumentalization of behavior for the purposes of modification, prediction, monetization, and control. In this formulation, ‘instrumentation’ refers to the puppet: the ubiquitous connected material architecture of sensate computation that renders, interprets, and actuates human experience. ‘Instrumentalization’ denotes the social relations that orient the puppet masters to human experience as surveillance capital wields the machines to transform us into means to others’ market ends."

"Totalitarianism operated through the means of violence, but instrumentarian power operates through the means of behavioral modification."
Henry Thoreau, *Walden, or, Life in the Woods* (1854)

“We do not ride on the railroad; it rides upon us.”


“I want to suggest that objects not only are shaped by work, but that they also take the shape of the work they do.”

“What makes the object ‘itself’ is what it allows us to do, and that ‘doing’ takes the object out of itself and makes it ‘point’ toward something, whether that something is an action or other objects.”

“It is when the hammer is broken or when I cannot use it, that I become aware of the hammer as an object-in-itself, rather than as object, which refers beyond itself to an action that I intend to perform.”

“What is being revealed when technologies are no longer ready for action?”

“A hammer might be broken and not enable me to do one thing, but it could still let me do something else. Failure, which is about the loss of the capacity to perform an action for which the object was intended is not property of an object, but rather of the failure of an object to extend a body, which we can define in terms of the extension of bodily capacities to perform actions.”

“Objects, as well as spaces, are made for some kinds of bodies more than others. Objects are made to size as well as made to order: while they come in a range of sizes, the sizes also presume certain kinds of bodies as having ‘sizes’ that will ‘match.’ In this way bodies and their objects tend toward each other; they are orientated toward each other, and are shaped by this orientation. When orientation ‘works,’ we are occupied. The failure of something to work is a matter of a *failed orientation*: a tool is used by a body for which it was not intended, or a body uses a tool that does not extend its capacity for action.”
“What lessons can we learn from objects? Art objects can tell us many things—about their origins, their intended and received meanings, their makes. But what can objects teach us about how to see? About how to see other objects, or bodies, in realms far removed from the museum, gallery, or studio? If it is possible to learn from objects how to see bodies differently, can they teach us to see gender differently, to shift the ways we perceive nonnormative genders?”

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1788)

“In the order of ends the human being (and with him every rational being) is an end in itself, that is, can never be used merely as a means by anyone with the being at the same time himself an end.”

“The term ‘performance art’ usually refers to art that incorporates the ‘body as an object’ to subvert cultural norms and explore social issues; a time-based medium, performance art’s most potent, electrifying, and lasting challenge is its radical evaporation of the distinction between art object and artist, blurring the lines ‘between action, performance, and a work of art.’

“My central contention in this book is that objecthood provides a means for black subjects to become art objects. Weilding their bodies as pliable matter, the black women performers discussed herein repeatedly become objects, often in the form of simulated beings, or what I term ‘avatars.’ I call this process *performing objecthood.* Becoming objects, in what follows, proves to be a powerful tool for performing one’s body, a ‘stylized repetition of acts’ that rescripts how black female bodies move and are perceived by others.”

“I argue for rescrambling the dichotomy between objectified bodies or embodied subjects by reimagining objecthood as a performance-based method that disrupts presumptive knowledges of black subjectivity. What happens, I ask, if we reimagine black objecthood as a way toward agency rather than its antithesis, as a strategy rather than simply a primal site of injury? […] Objecthood is a concept that offers us a powerful lens to think through art, performance, and black female embodiment. […] I propose that forms of subjectivity and agency are always present, however minuscule they may be, in the often complex and rigorous performances of objecthood I trace in this book.”


"Manual: of or pertaining to the hand or hands, done or performed with the hands. Now especially of (physical) labor, on occupation, etc., as opposed to mental, theoretical. Manual as distinguished from the mind and the intellectual. Manual: as of a weapon, tool, implement, etc.; that is used or worked with the hand or hands. [...] The use of the body as tool or instrument. Of occupation or possession. Able to have in one’s own hands, as in possession is three-fifths of the law, as in possession makes you three-fifths of a human, as in property handled by another. Also to be possessed. To be handled as if owned, annexed, branded, invaded, ingested, not autonomous. Manual: to be wielded by another, to be wielded on a whim; to be wielded as an exercise of another’s will, to be severed from one’s own will or motives or desires. [...]"

Manual: As of pertaining to the hand or hands. [...] Hands, no longer yours, contracted, owned, and directed by another, like a tool or object. The hands that handle you. The hands up the dress, the hands on your ass, the hands that pull down your undergarments, the hands that pin you to the floor. The hands that pay you two dollars for the day or thirteen dollars for the week. Manual: as of subject to use, made a tool, handled, grasped, palmed, slapped, fondled, hugged, harassed, caressed; as of pertaining to the hand.”

“My objecthood became my subjecthood.”


“At the same time that I abandon traditional art media for the plastic possibilities of my own body, it appears that I must also abandon the self-enclosed aesthetic concerns which motivated me: (1) as a human being, any identity I may assume seems to depend largely on my interaction with other human beings. And just as I define myself as an individual partially in terms of how I affect others, defining myself as an art object seems to necessitate the significance of my effect on others in much the same way; (2) as an artist separate from my art, I saw the effect of my existence in the existence of the work: the work changed the world for me by adding something new that wasn’t there before. Thus in the existence of the work, I saw my effect on the world at large. But now I become identical with the artwork, and the sequence is shortened: as an art object, I want simply to look outside myself and see the effect of my existence on the world at large.”

Louis Chude-Sokei, “Introduction,” from The Sound of Culture: Diaspora and Black Technopoetics (2016)

“How we have come to know and understand technology has been long intertwined in how we have deployed and made sense of race, particularly in the case of blacks and Africans in a world made by slavery and colonialism. The language of one is consistently dependent on or infected with thinking about the other”

“Technology has always been racialized or been articulated in relationship to race. [...] It’s no accident that questions of whether or not slaves had souls and could think, had intelligence, or were mere mimics continue to be guiding questions in how technology has been framed, from eighteenth-century automata to artificial intelligence and Japanese robotics. [...] The most necessary theorizing and politicizing of artificial life and computer intelligence can and has come from the black diaspora itself as a product of its extensive thinking about the African slave as an automaton, a creature either less than or other to life.”

“[T]he lexicon of associations for blacks as liminal, not-quite human beings in the age of racial slavery They were or were like animals; they were or were like machines; and so they could be and were many things and were figured as such. It is that metaphoric flexibility—or hyperproductive lack as Sylvia Wynter might put it—that makes it possible the long tradition of using blacks to either represent technology or metaphorically oppose it; to use blacks as ciphers for machines or tuse machines in ways that depend on either representations of blacks.”

“A study of persons and things might reveal all of the ways we already treat persons as things, and how humanness is mired in an inability to do otherwise.”

“Using people, transforming others into a means for obtaining an end of oneself, is generally considered the very antithesis of ethical behavior. And with good reason. Faced with the violence of colonial, sexual, and even epistemological appropriation, ethical theorists have sought to replace domination with respect, knowledge with responsibility. But it often seems as though a thought that begins in intersubjectivity or mutuality ends up sounding like a mere defense of the Other against the potential violence of the Subject. [...] If ethics is defined in relation to the potentially violent excesses of the subject’s power, then that power is in reality being presupposed and reinforced in the very attempt to undercut it. What is being denied from the outset is the subject’s lack of power, its vulnerability and dependence. Respect and distance are certainly better than violence and appropriation, but is ethics only a form of restraint? In this chapter I take for granted the necessity of critiques of the imperial subject, but I would nevertheless like to question the model of intactness on which such critiques usually rely. Might there not, at least on the psychological level, be another way to use people?”

“Perhaps a synonym for ‘using people’ would be, paradoxically, ‘trusting people,’ creating a space of play and risk that does not depend on maintaining intactness and separation.”

Donald Winnicott, “The use of an object and relating through identifications” from Playing and Reality (1971)

“It is perhaps necessary to prevaricate a little longer to give my own view on the difference between object-relating and object-usage. In object-relating the subject allows certain alterations in the self to take place, of a kind that has caused us to invent the term ‘cathexis’. The object has become meaningful. Projection mechanisms and identifications have been operating, and the subject is depleted to the extent that something of the subject is found in the object, though enriched by feeling. Accompanying these changes is some degree of physical involvement (however slight) towards excitement, in the direction of the functional climax of an orgasm. [...] Object-relating is an experience of the subject that can be described in terms of the subject as an isolate. When I speak of the use of an object, however, I take object-relating for granted, and add new features that involve the nature and the behavior of the object. For instance, the object, if it is to be used, must necessarily be real in the sense of being part of shared reality, not a bundle of projections. It is this, I think, that makes for the world of difference that there is between relating and usage.”

“Object-relating can be described in terms of the experience of the subject. Description of object-usage involves consideration of the nature of the object. I am offering for discussion the reasons why, in my opinion, a capacity to use an object is more sophisticated than a capacity to relate to objects; and relating may be to a subjective object, but usage implies that the object is part of external reality. This sequence can be observed: 1) Subject relates to object. 2) Object is in process of being found instead of placed by the subject in the world. 3) Subject destroys object. 4) Object survives destruction. 5) Subject can use object.

The object is always being destroyed. This destruction becomes the unconscious background for love of a real object; that is, an object outside the area of the subject’s omnipotent control. Study of this problem involves a statement of the positive value of destructiveness. The destructiveness, plus the object’s survival of the destruction, places the object outside the area of objects set up by the subject’s projective mental mechanisms. In this way a world of shared reality is created which the subject can use and which can fee back other-than-me substance into the subject.”

“Apparatuses are not mere observing instruments but boundary-drawing practices—specific material (re)configurings of the world—which come to matter.”

“Apparatuses are not passive observing instruments; on the contrary, they are productive of (and part of) phenomena.”

“(1) Apparatuses are specific material-discursive practices (they are not merely laboratory setups that embody human concepts and take measurements); (2) apparatuses produce differences that matter—they are boundary-making practices that are formative of matter and meaning, productive of and part of the phenomena produced; (3) apparatuses are material configurations/dynamic reconfigurings of the world; (4) apparatuses are themselves phenomena (constituted and dynamically reconstituted as part of the ongoing intra-activity of the world); (5) apparatuses have no intrinsic boundaries but are open-ended practices; and (6) apparatuses are not located in the world but are material configurations or reconfigurings of the world that re(con)figure spatiality and temporality as well as (the traditional notion of) dynamics (i.e., they do not exist as static structures, nor do they merely unfold or evolve in space and time).”


“Why not walk on your head, sing with your sinuses, see through your skin, breathe with your belly? [...] Find your body without organs. Find out how to make it.”

“We come to the gradual realization that the BwO [Body without Organs] is not at all the opposite of the organs. The organs are not its enemies. The enemy is the organism. The BwO is opposed not to the organs but to that organization of the organs called the organism. It is true that Artaud wages a struggle against the organs, but at the same time what he is going after, what he has it in for, is the organism: The body is the body. Alone it stands. And in no need of organs. Organism it never is. Organisms are the enemies of the body. The BwO is not opposed to the organs; rather, the BwO and its "true organs," which must be composed and positioned, are opposed to the organism, the organic organization of the organs. [...] The organism is not at all the body, the BwO; rather, it is a stratum on the BwO, in other words, a phenomenon of accumulation, coagulation, and sedimentation that, in order to extract useful labor from the BwO, imposes upon it forms, functions, bonds, dominant and hierarchized organizations, organized transcendences.”