

# **Repression of Civil Insurgency Campaigns** under Authoritarian Regimes

#### ABSTRACT

The end of the Second World War and the creation of the United Nations did not guarantee the eradication of authoritarian regimes from the international scene. The second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was characterized by the rise of authoritarian governments in Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and South East Asia. My research aims to look for correlations between the degree of repressive measures taken by authoritarian states and the structure of individual civil insurgency campaigns (campaign backlash, security and state defections, campaign structure, prior concessions), as well as macroeconomic indicators (GDP growth, the Consumer Price Index and indicators of wealth distribution inequality). At this point in the project, we can observe a correlation between the degree of state repression and the existence of increased campaign mobilization, previous concessions and of state defections.



### PROGRAM ON TERRORISM ······· AND INSURGENCY RESEARCH

The PTIR program aims to disaggregate nonviolent violent campaigns, most notably by focusing on the ty sequence, and outcomes of different tactics employed by arr and unarmed insurgents during each campaign.

The data used for this project was supplied by Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) base. The NAVCO 2.0 data base is an ongoing project that a to map the structure of individual campaigns along the lines of

- Campaign Specific Variables
- Campaign Diversity Variables
- Campaign Administration Variables
- Campaign Support Variables
- Campaign Effect Variables
- Audience Backlash against State Repression
- Regime Defections

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# **Regional Breakdown (218 campaign years)**

South and South-East Asia (21) North Africa and the Middle East (46) Sub-Saharan Africa (35) Latin America (97) Europe (19)



# PROJECT OBJECTIVES

To estimate the effects of each independent variable on the likelihood of state repression, I employed the multinomial logistic regression model, which compares the probabilities that different independent variables will result in each respective outcome: mild, moderate and extreme repression. Measuring Repression:

• <u>mild</u>: threatening action short of physical violence, use of economic fees to increase the cost of opposition • <u>moderate</u>: violent action aimed at coercing opponents, harassment and imprisonment of campaign members • <u>extreme</u>: intent to kill and violently silence opponents, use

of torture or severe violence, mass violence

# Effects of Campaign Characteristics on the Degree of **Repression Given Violent Regime Crackdown**

•			Moderate
		Mild Repression	<u>Repression</u>
and			
ype,	Backlash (t-1)	6.91***	20.49***
med	Security Defections	4.86	3.59
•	State Defections	0.00	0.26*
	Campaign Structure	0.67	0.51
the	Progress (t-1)	0.24	0.16**
data	GDP growth	1.11	1.05
uala	GDP growth (t-1)	1.06	0.99
aims :	Gini index	0.96	0.93
f:	Consumer Price Index	1.05	1.04
	CPI (t-1)	0.99	0.98
	N	218	218
•	Chi <sup>2</sup>	93.36	93.36
•	$Prob > chi^2$	0.00	0.00
•	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.24	0.24
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TERRORISM ······			Moderate	
GENCY RESEARCH		<u>Mild Repression</u>	<u>Repression</u>	Extreme Repression
a aims to disaggregate nonviolent and st notably by focusing on the type, of different tactics employed by armed buring each campaign. or this project was supplied by the Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) data ata base is an ongoing project that aims dividual campaigns along the lines of: Cariables	Backlash (t-1) Security Defections State Defections Campaign Structure Progress (t-1) GDP growth GDP growth (t-1) Gini index Consumer Price Index CPI (t-1)	<b>6.91***</b> 4.86 0.00 0.67 0.24 1.11 1.06 0.96 1.05 0.99	<b>20.49***</b> 3.59 <b>0.26*</b> 0.51 <b>0.16**</b> 1.05 0.99 0.93 1.04 0.98	8.36*** 4.65 0.35* 0.83 0.23** 0.98 0.98 0.97 1.07 0.95
Variables ation Variables ariables iables gainst State Repression	N Chi <sup>2</sup> Prob > chi <sup>2</sup> Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> NOTE: RRR (relative risk ra are relative to the abser 0.05; and *p < 0.10. The S	218 93.36 0.00 0.24 atio) coefficients repondence of repressive mea Small-Hsiao test was a	218 93.36 0.00 0.24 orted for ease of inte sures. Significance pplied for robustne	218 93.36 0.00 0.24 erpretation; coefficients levels: ***p < 0.01; **p < ess.
GEMENTS	•••••			,



RESULTS

The analysis demonstrates that the presence of domestic mobilization determines authoritarian increased regimes to use violence against members of opposition campaigns. Furthermore, the presence of state defections partly explains the increased likelihood that authoritarian states will resort to moderate and extreme means of repression in dealing with political opponents. An interesting result of this analysis is that authoritarian regimes tend to be less permissive of civil insurgency campaigns once concessions have already been made. Poor economic performance and high levels of income distribution inequality do not seem to affect the degree of repressive measures take by authoritarian governments.

Given that this project was run on a fraction of the total number of campaigns that will be coded by NAVCO 2.0, the results will inevitably be altered. Nonetheless, a future study of the degree of repressive actions taken by authoritarian regimes could reiterate the influence that campaign backlash, state defections and prior concessions have on the degree of state repression.

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